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Abstract
We explore the financial sustainability of a typical U.S. state civil servants pension fund
under the continuation of current policies and under alternative policies, such as changes
in contribution, indexation and investment allocation policies. Applying the value-based
asset-liability management method, we find that all participant cohorts derive substantial
net benefit from the current pension contract, while all tax-paying cohorts have to make
substantial contributions. The proposed adjustment measures can alleviate a substantial
part of the burden on tax payers, although at the cost of the fund participants. Especially
a policy of conditional inflation indexation seems promising.
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In the past decades the U.S. has witnessed a trend away from defined-benefit (DB) towards
defined-contribution (DC) pension plans. However, an exception to this trend are the state
pension plans, which manage the pensions of the state civil servants.Despite the aging of the
population these plans still largely operate on a DB basis, although it is clear that in most cases
the promises made to participants of the state pension funds cannot be honored in the absence of
drastic measures to guarantee the financial sustainability of these funds. However, the pension
promises made to the state employees cannot so easily be reneged upon (see Brown and Wilcox
(2009)). In fact, these promises may even get priority to the states’ debt holders when a state
goes bankrupt. Hence, in many instances, a state’s pension fund threatens the state’s public
finances, possibly resulting in large claims on its tax payers and, to the extent that taxes cannot
be raised, in a crowding out of public services. A recent overview by Munnell et al. (2013) of
the funding ratios (ratios of assets over liabilities) of U.S. state pension funds illustrates the
urgency of the problem. For a sample of 109 state plans and 17 locally-administered plans, the
paper estimates the aggregate funding ratio for 2012 at 73%. Almost a quarter of the plans
have a funding ratio below 60%, while only a small fraction of 6% have a funding ratio above
100%. The funding ratios are calculated on the basis of GASB standards that prescribe that
assets are reported on an actuarially-smoothed basis, while the discount rate for the liabilities
is typically set at around 8 percent, reflecting the expected long-term investment return on
the fund’s assets. These standards have been criticized by economists (Novy-Marx and Rauh
(2009) and Bader and Gold (2003)) who claim that the future streams of benefit payments
should be discounted at a discount rate reflecting their riskiness. As the state pension benefits
are protected under most state laws, these payments can be seen as guaranteed and so this
would plead for discounting future benefits against the risk-free interest rate. Doing so would
lead to a severe fall in the already-low average funding ratios of the state plans. However,
a precise assessment of the riskiness of state pension promises likely remains elusive for the
foreseeable future. For example, the recent default of the city of Detroit may be an instructive
case of whether pensions should be seen as a contractual obligation that cannot be diminished
or impaired, or whether the holders of pension rights should be treated like other creditors, so
that benefit cuts cannot be ruled out. In fact, a U.S. bankruptcy judge declared in December
2013 that legally pensions can be cut (Bomey and Priddle, 2013).
In this paper we explore the financial sustainability and redistributional features of a typ-
ical U.S. state defined-benefit (DB) pension plan under unchanged fund policies and under
alternative policies in terms of contributions, benefits or indexation aimed at alleviating the
financial burden on the tax payer. We assume that pension promises cannot be defaulted upon.
We apply the so-called method of value-based asset-liability management (value-based ALM)
to address reform-induced value redistribution among the different stakeholders of the fund,
i.e. the various cohorts of plan participants and tax payers. Essentially, the method involves
rewriting a pension plan in terms of embedded options held by the fund’s stakeholders. By
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providing a market-based valuation of all cash flows associated with the pension contract, the
method demonstrates the consequences of the various interventions for the different stakehold-
ers. Policy changes are always a zero-sum game, implying that the total value of the contract
to all stakeholders together is unchanged and that policy changes can only shift value among
groups of stakeholders. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt at applying
value-based ALM to the study of reform-induced redistribution within U.S. state pension funds.
The value-based ALM approach has its roots in the pioneering papers of Sharpe (1976) and
Sharpe and Treynor (1977) in utilizing derivative pricing to value contingent claims within
pension funds. More recent applications of derivative pricing to pension plans are, among
others, Blake (1998), Exley et al. (1997), Chapman et al. (2001), Ponds (2003), Bader and
Gold (2007) and Hoevenaars and Ponds (2008). Our paper is closest in spirit to Biggs (2010),
which also employs an option-based approach to value the market price of pension liabilities
of U.S. state pension plans. However, it does not address reform plans and the associated
redistribution effects. Value-based ALM has also been employed in the Dutch discussion on
the redesign of the second-pillar pension funds offering defined-benefit plans. In particular, the
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (2012) has applied it to investigate the
generational fairness of various pension reform plans.
Our paper is complementary to related contributions studying the degree of underfunding of
U.S. state pension plans, the causes of underfunding and the measures that could be taken
to solve plan deficits. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) conduct a careful analysis of the value of
the pension promises made by U.S. state pension funds under different assumptions about the
riskiness of state pension plans and their seniority relative to state debt in the case of default.
Several papers explore the extent of underfunding and the question what the appropriate target
of the funding ratio should be (compare D’Arcy et al. (1999), Bohn (2011), Lucas and Zeldes
(2009)). Brown et al. (2011) put forward the U.S. academic and public discussions that assume
that adequate funding requires 100% funding of the liabilities.
Regarding the causes of the underfunding of state pension plans, some papers point at the
implications of what may be called the ‘accounting game’. The accountability horizon of pension
fund management, politicians and public sector union leaders is much shorter than the horizon
over which pension promises have to be met by adequate funding. Hence, union leaders and
politicians tend to downplay the long-term costs of pension promises in favor of higher short-
term wages and benefits (Mitchel and Smith (1994), Schieber (2011)), as well as higher state
spending in the short run. Shnitser (2013) stresses the role of the institutional design of pension
plans in explaining the large variation in funding discipline. Institutional rules facilitating
transparency and pre-commitment to expert-based financial and actuarial advice, in particular,
appear to be conducive to mitigating underfunding and limiting the shift of costs to future tax
payers. Kelley (2014), and Elder and Wagner (2014) employ a public choice perspective to
explain underfunding issues.
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Essentially, the literature has explored three broad directions of solutions to the underfunding
problem: higher contributions, lower benefits and higher investment returns. Novy-Marx and
Rauh (2014b) explore by how much contributions need to be raised to reach full funding in
30 years time. They compute a necessary increase of the order of 2.5 times the prevailing
contribution level. The option of reducing benefits has long been seen as virtually impossible,
as in many states public pensions are interpreted as hard contractual obligations, protected
by civil law and state constitutions (Monahan, 2012). However, recently several states have
enacted benefit cuts and other measures to scale back the generosity of pensions. Novy-Marx
and Rauh (2014a) explore performance-linked indexation rules as an alternative to automatic
cost-of-living adjustments, like the one in the Wisconsin Retirement System or the conditional
indexation rule in the Netherlands (Ponds and van Riel (2009) and Beetsma and Bucciol (2010,
2011a and 2011b)). Shnitser (2013) stresses that simply scaling back generosity or imposing
higher contribution rates will not be enough. She claims that foremost institutional design has
to be reframed to practices and rules that have proven to be successful in promoting to funding
discipline. A third route proposed to solve funding deficits is to raise expected investment
returns. This option is already being exploited by U.S. state pension funds, as many of them
have high portfolio shares in equity, substantially higher than of pension funds outside the
U.S. (Andonov et al. (2013) and OECD (2011)). However, finance-based papers (Black (1989),
Peskin (2001), Bader and Gold (2003), Lucas and Zeldes (2009) and Pennacchi and Rastad
(2011)) recommend that the strategic asset allocation should be set in line with the perspective
of the tax payers as the party bearing the residual risk, which suggests to limit mismatch risk
between the funds’ assets and the market value of their liabilities. This may imply no equity
investment at all when one aims at full protection of accrued benefits in the short run. Lucas
and Zeldes (2009), employing a long-term perspective, suggest that the optimal portfolio should
include some equity holdings as future pension liabilities are related to future wage growth and
this growth is to some extent correlated with equity returns.
We simulate a representative pension fund over a period of three-quarters of a century. The
standard or ”classic” ALM results reveal that raising the share of the amortization cost that
is contributed, speeding up the amortization payment or halving indexation to consumer-price
inflation leads to a substantial long-term improvement of the funding ratio. A policy that is of
particular interest is a policy of inflation indexation that is conditional on the funding ratio.
A funding ratio below one leads to less-than-full or even zero indexation, while a funding ratio
above one leads to more than full indexation. Such type of indexation policy has become popular
among Dutch pension funds. This way of using indexation has a tendency of improving the
financial position of the fund, but at the same time compressing the spread in the distribution
of possible funding ratios and, thereby, also compressing the spread in the distribution of
contribution rates, as its amortization component is linked to the funding ratio. Hence, a
well-designed policy of conditional indexation may be of particular interest for policymakers
concerned with a redesign of the U.S. system of state pension plans.
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Our value-based ALM results show that the current pension contract yields a substantial net
benefit to all cohorts of fund participants, which in turn implies a substantial financial burden
on all cohorts of tax payers. In present value terms, during the 75-years horizon under the
base plan the fund participants receive almost 28 trillion dollars in net benefit, while the tax
payers contribute approximately 17 trillion dollars. Increasing the amortization contribution
rate and speeding up amortization without addressing the benefit level improves the residual
value of the fund at the end of our projection horizon, but it does not affect the contract value
to the participants over our simulation horizon. A doubling of the contribution rate by the
participants does affect their net benefit from the pension contract. The cohorts that have
not yet entered the labor force lose about a quarter of the value of their pension contract,
while older participants lose about 10%. In money terms, the tax payers benefit by an amount
of almost 4.5 trillion dollars, or between a quarter and one-third of the contract value for
young and older tax payers, respectively. Reducing benefits by cutting indexation can be quite
effective too. Halving the indexation to CPI inflation reduces the contract value by around
20% for both young and old participants, while making indexation conditional on the funding
ratio is even more effective, leading to a reduction in the participants’ contract value on the
order of 25-30%. In dollar terms the alleviation of the burden on the tax payers is about 3-4
trillion dollars. Older tax payers benefit by 10-15% of their contract value, young tax payers
by about double those figures. Changes in the pension fund’s investment portfolio do not affect
the participants values, though they do lead to minor shifts in value between tax payers and
the fund’s residual value.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, including
a description of the demography, the pension fund and the calculation of the fund’s benefits
and liabilities. Sections 3 - 5, respectively, describe the data, our economic scenario generator
and the valuation of the cash flows following from the pension contract. Section 6 summarizes
the baseline settings, while Section 7 presents the various reforms we will consider. Section 8
discusses the simulation results for the classic ALM and the value-based ALM. Finally, Section
9 concludes the main text of this paper. The appendices are not intended for publication, but
will be posted on the authors’ websites.
2 The model
This section describes the demography, wage developments and the pension fund. The survival
probabilities are deterministic. Hence, there is no longevity risk.
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2.1 The population
The participant population of the pension fund consists of individuals of ages 25 to 99 years.
Individuals enter the fund at the age of 25 and remain with the fund for the rest of their life.
Further, we assume that they retire at age aR. The number of male and female participants
of age a at time t is denoted as Mat and F
a
t respectively, where a ∈ [25, 99]. The population
size for the rest of the simulation for each age group is determined using the projections of















the probabilities that a male, respectively female, person aged a in period t will survive another
n years.
2.2 Wages
Crucial for the calculation of the pension liabilities are the wage developments. The wage level
of the cohort of age a at time t is W at and it is updated each time period. We do not take into
account idiosyncratic wage risk, hence we assume a uniform wage level within each cohort. The
wage levels across cohorts will be set to follow a certain career profile. We set the wage levels
of males and females equal, although one could in principle allow for different wage levels or
career profiles depending on gender. The nominal wage level evolves as follows:





where wa−1t−1 is the gross wage growth rate from period t − 1 to t for a cohort aged a − 1 in
period t − 1. This factor can be disaggregated into the economy-wide gross wage growth rate
wt−1 and a component w̃
a−1




We refer to w̃a−1t−1 as the promotion rate from period t − 1 to t for someone aged a − 1 in
period t − 1. Note that w̃a−1t−1 is always positive if the career profile has an upward sloping
shape. Promotion rates differ across ages. However, we assume that the career profile remains
constant over time, which implies that w̃a−1t−1 = w̃
a−1 in all periods. Hence, the ratio of the wage
levels of two workers of different ages is constant over time. Economy-wide wage growth rate
wt−1 is stochastic and will be modeled as explained in Section 4 below.
Given the current wage rate, based on (1), we calculate an age-a individual’s expected wage i












,∀i ∈ {1, aR − 1− a} , (2)
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= w̃a+j · Et [wt+j], for j ≥ 1.
2.3 The pension fund
State pension funds can differ in many respects. Some of the differences are parametric, such
as the value of the discount rate to be applied when calculating the liabilities, while other
differences are more fundamental. We model a pension fund based on the most common
features across the entire population of pension funds available to us from the Public Plans
Database of the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2014).
2.3.1 Assets
Market value of assets The market value of the fund’s assets at the beginning of the next
year, At+1, is equal to the asset value At at the beginning of this year, multiplied by its gross
rate of return Rt, plus the net money inflow times the gross return over the half year over which
it is on average invested:
At+1 = AtRt + (Ct −Bt)R1/2t , (3)
where Ct is the total amount of contributions received (calculated below) and Bt the total
amount of benefits paid out. Since the benefits and contributions are (usually) paid on a
monthly basis, while our model runs on a yearly basis, we assume that the payment of the
benefits and contributions takes place in the middle of the calendar year and, hence, the net
money inflow is invested on average for half a year.
Actuarial assets Pension fund assets in the U.S. are not measured at their market value
when they are used as an input for pension policy. Rather, pension funds in the U.S. apply a
certain smoothing procedure to come up with an actuarial value Aactt of their assets in period t.
Its detailed calculation is laid out in Appendix A. In short, the actuarial value of the assets at
the end of the year is equal to the actuarial value at the end of previous year, plus the net cash
flows into the fund, plus the projected return on the assets, and a recognition of the smoothed
excess of actual above expected investment income. In the special case that initial actuarial
assets equal the initial market value of the assets, Aact0 = A0, and the smoothing period is
shrunk to a single period, one has that Aactt = At, for all t ≥ 0. Hence, in this specific case the
process for actuarial assets coincides with that of the market value of the assets.
2.3.2 Calculation of the liabilities
In this section we will formalize the calculation of the liabilities, closely following Munnell et al.
(2008b) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011). Total liabilities Lt are calculated as the present
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value of the projected future benefit payments to all current pension fund participants, taking
into account the survival probabilities. The group of participants comprises the employees and
the retired. The total liabilities are the sum of the liabilities Lmt and L
f
t to the male and female
participants. The liabilities to each gender, in turn, are calculated by multiplying the individual
liability La,ζt to an age-a and gender-ζ individual by the number of gender-ζ individuals in this






























where Ka+it,t+i is the projection at time t of the pension pay-out i years ahead for a participant
of age a and R̃
(i)
t is the interest rate used to discount to period t the cash flows materializing i
periods into the future. We notice that R̃
(0)
t = 1 and p
ζ,0
a,t = 1. U.S. public pension plans usually
use a discount rate that is flat over the entire projection horizon and equal to the expected
asset portfolio return R̄t. Summarizing, the liabilities to an individual of a particular cohort
depend on the years they will (still) receive benefits, the level of the benefits, the discount rate
and the survival probabilities.
Under plausible parameter settings the value of the liabilities peaks at around retirement age.
The reason is that the workers close to retirement have reached the maximum time span over
which pension rights can be accumulated, while most of their benefits occur in the relatively
near future, so that the effect of discounting is relatively limited. Younger individuals have fewer
years of accruals, while any given benefits occur further into the future. Older individuals expect
to receive fewer remaining benefit payments. Moreover, the average of the highest wages during
a career, which forms the basis for the pension benefits (see below), falls with age in a cross-
section of retirees. The reason is that nominal wage growth tends to exceed the cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA) they have received while in retirement.
Calculation of pensioners’ benefits To protect the living standards of the retired as much
as possible, pensioners receive a COLA, which we denote as πt. The COLA usually covers a
certain share of inflation and it is often capped at a predetermined level (Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College, 2014):
πt = 1 + min{α · cpi, cap},
where cpi stands for consumer-price inflation, α is the fraction of inflation compensated and
cap is the maximum indexation rate. (Both cpi and cap are expressed as a fraction of unity.)
The current pay-out to a retiree equals the current pension rights, Bat , while the projected











Et [πt+j] , ∀i ∈ [1, 99− a] ,∀a ∈ [aR, 98] ,







πt−j,∀a ∈ [aR + 1, 99] .
For example, the pension rights of a 70-year old person, who retired at the age aR = 65, are
equal to the benefit calculated when that person reached the age of 65, plus the indexation
that has been awarded over the 5 years since then.
A common feature of the state pension plans in the U.S. is that they are based on the average
wage preceding the moment of exit from the workforce. Concretely, the benefit of somebody
retiring in year t− (a− aR) can be calculated as the product of the accrual rate ε, the number






W aR−lt−(a−aR)−l,∀a ∈ [aR, 99] .
The averaging period z varies from one to five years, with the majority of public plans applying
a three–year average (Munnell et al., 2012).
Because the pension rights for the retired are already determined and, hence, cannot be affected
by future service or salary increases, they are independent of the method we use to recognize
the liabilities – see below.
Calculation of workers’ projected benefits The calculation of the projected pay-outs to
current employees is similar to that of the pensioners, i.e. as the pension rights Bat at time t of
someone of age a, adjusted for future indexation during retirement:
1In practice, COLAs are only included in the calculation of the liabilities to the pensioners if there exists
an explicit policy rule on how the indexation is awarded. COLAs are not taken into account if indexation is










Et [πt+j] ,∀i ∈ [aR + 1− a, 99− a] ,∀a ∈ [25, aR − 1] ,
where the first line gives the projected benefit during the first year of retirement, while the
second line gives the projected benefit during the ensuing years in retirement. Determining the
pension rights Bat is not as straightforward for the working population as it is for the pensioners.
Unlike pensioners, the active participants continue working and, hence, they are expected to
accrue more years of service and (in most cases) to have a salary at retirement date that is
higher than their current salary. Hence, depending on the method used, their pension rights




Methods for recognizing liabilities There are different methods to recognize liabilities.
Here, we will explain the so-called Accrued Benefit Obligation (ABO) method, the Projected
Benefit Obligation (PBO) method and the Projected Value of Benefits (PVB) method.2 The
latter is also known as the Present Value of Future Benefits method.
Under the ABO method, only the pension rights accrued up until time t are taken into account.
Hence, Bat is based on the number of years since entry into the workforce and the average of






W a−lt−l ,∀a ∈ [26, aR] ,
B25t = 0.
The youngest cohort of age 25 has just entered the fund and has no rights accrued yet. The
rights of the other young cohorts who do not yet have z years in service are based on the average
of the available wage history. For the cohorts that have at least z years of service, the pension
rights are the product of the years in the workforce, the accrual rate and the average pay over
the past z years. Hence, for an individual worker the ABO pension rights increase with each
additional year of service.
Under the PBO method, we also take into account the effect of expected future salary increases
on the rights accrued up to now. Hence, under this method Bat is the projected benefit level at
2There is also the Vested Benefit Obligation (VBO), which considers only employees who have served at
least the fund’s vesting period, if their is one. However, this variant is not meaningful in our context, because
we assume that everybody works for 40 years.
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,∀a ∈ [26, aR − 1] ,
B25t = 0.
Again, the youngest cohort, the 25 years old, has no accrual yet and, hence, it has no pension
rights in terms of the PBO. However, for a given age and assuming that the overall wage level
is expected to increase, the pension rights for the other working cohorts are higher under the
PBO method than under the ABO method. When the worker nears its retirement age, the
difference of accrued rights in PBO and ABO terms shrinks. The two measures merge for a
given individual at the moment of their retirement.
Finally, state jobs are relatively secure, so that the pension fund might in addition consider the
rights that the employees will acquire in the future if they continue working in their job until
retirement. The PVB method takes this into account. Therefore, it defines the pension rights










,∀a ∈ [25, aR − 1] . (5)
Note that in this case the generation that has just entered the labor force already has a stake
in the pension liabilities, as opposed to ABO and PBO. At any given age before retirement,
rights computed according to the PVB method exceed rights computed according to ABO or
PBO, because PVB takes into account both expected future increases in the wage level and
expected future accrual. All three measures merge for a given individual at the moment of
their retirement.
2.4 Contributions and benefits
2.4.1 The entry-age normal costing method and the accrued liability
The value of the additional pension rights earned in a given year is called the normal cost. The
present value of the future normal cost will be used to calculate what is called the fund’s accrued
liability, which will be compared with the fund’s actuarial assets to establish the required
amortization payments.
The fund’s actuaries determine the normal cost based on the liability recognition method used
by the pension fund. The two most common methods for calculating the normal cost are the
so-called projected unit credit method, which is mostly used in the private sector, and the so-
11
called entry-age normal costing (EAN) method, which is dominant in public plans and which is
related to the PVB. Here, we explain only the EAN method, as it is the method we will use in
our calculations. Under the EAN method, the employer’s annual normal cost associated with
an individual participant is calculated as a payment throughout the projected years of service
needed to finance the PVB obligation. Since the accrued benefits due to salary growth increase
more than linearly, the method implies a component of front-loading, because the employer is
pre-paying some of the benefits to be earned in the future (Munnell et al., 2008b).
The payment of the normal cost can be calculated in dollar terms or as a percentage of projected
salary levels. Here, we will explain the latter, as it is the more commonly used method. The
normal cost rate (NCR) of an active participant is calculated at the entry age as the ratio of




, ζ ∈ {f ;m},
where L25,ζt is the liability to someone of gender ζ who enters the labor force in period t as
calculated in (4) on the basis of the PVB method (as in (5), i.e. taking into account future
accrual associated with future service), and PVW 25,ζt is the present value of all future wages
throughout the participant’s career as projected at entry. Hence, the normal cost rate is
the percentage payment of a worker’s projected career salary needed to cover the cost of the
projected benefits for that worker.


















is computed according to (2). The present value of a
worker’s future normal cost (PV FNC) are the normal costs that will be recognized throughout
its remaining years of service:





Hence, this is the product of the present value of future wages and the normal cost rate deter-
mined at the time when the worker entered the fund. The so-called accrued liability (Laccr) for
this participant will then be the difference between the liabilities to this participant, calculated
as the present value of the projected benefits, and the present value of the future normal cost:
La,ζaccr,t = L
a,ζ
t − PV FNC
a,ζ
t .
If we follow the individual worker over time, we will see that the present value of the future
normal cost will decrease, as there will be fewer remaining years to pay the normal cost.
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Therefore, accrued liability associated with an individual increases over time. The accrued
liability of pensioners is simply equal to the present value of their future benefits, since they
should have paid the whole normal cost before reaching the retirement age. Therefore,




t ,∀a ∈ [aR, 99] .




















The annual contribution to the pension fund is paid by both the employer and the workers.
Combined the two payments form the total contribution, which we determine as a sum of two
components: the normal cost and the amortization payment of the so-called unfunded actuarial
accrued liability (UAAL), defined as the difference between the fund’s accrued liability and the
actuarial value of the assets:
UAALt = Laccr,t − Aactt .
The amortization payment, like the normal cost, can be determined as a dollar amount or a
percentage of projected salaries. We will use the former. The amortization payment cannot be
negative. Hence, if there is a funding surplus, the normal cost covering contribution cannot be
reduced. We assume a smoothing period of u years for the amortization of the UAAL, implying
that the required amortization payment in period t is:
AMORTt =
 1uUAALt if UAALt ≥ 0,0 if UAALt < 0.
Munnell et al. (2008a) show that only about half of all the plans pay the annually required
contribution. Hence, in our simulations we will include a parameter λ of the fraction of the
required amortization payment that is actually paid.
The aggregate volume of contributions that should be paid to the pension fund in year t by all






























The total contribution rate can be split into a contribution rate cWt paid by the worker and a






Typically, the worker pays a fixed contribution rate, in which case cWt is constant, while the
employer pays the remaining part. It is also possible that the employee contribution is a
fixed proportion of actuarially required contribution, in which case cWt may change over time.
However, in our simulations we will focus on the case of a constant worker contribution rate.
2.4.3 Total benefits










Forecasting the development of a pension fund over a long horizon implies that there exist
scenarios in which the fund’s assets get depleted. Therefore, we assume that, whenever the
pension fund’s assets become insufficient to finance the net cash outflow, the employer/tax
payer, provides sponsor support by replenishing the fund’s assets. The sponsor support, SSt,
comes on top of the employer/tax payer’s regular contribution:
SSt =
0 if At ≥ Bt − Ct,(Bt − Ct)− At if At < Bt − Ct,
so that the sponsor support covers the difference between the assets and the net cash outflow.
Once the sponsor support becomes positive, the fund’s assets are depleted and the fund effec-
tively continues to be run on a pay-as-you-go basis. The sponsor support is part of the total
contribution included in the calculation of the actuarial assets (see Appendix A).
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2.6 The funding ratio
The evaluation of the pension fund’s financial position is usually based on its funding ratio





The funding ratio measures the financial health of the pension fund and is an important quantity
to guide the policies of the fund.
3 The data
All our data are for the U.S. Our dataset comprises macroeconomic data, data from financial
markets, data on state pension funds and demographic data. The economic scenario generator
described in the following section is based on historical data spanning the third quarter of
1971 up to and including the last quarter of 2012. We use historical time series of the short
interest rate, stock returns, price inflation and wage inflation, which are the state variables of
the VAR model presented below. The short interest rate is 3-month Treasury rate series and
it is obtained from two sources. The data until 1982 come from the Handbook of Monetary
Economics (McCulloch, 1990). The data from 1982 onwards is available through the Economic
Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2014a). For the stock returns we use
the value-weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq return including dividends, which is available from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (2014b). For price inflation we use the CPI index
provided in Treasury and Inflation Indices dataset by the Center for Research in Security Prices
(2014a). Finally, wage inflation is the compensation of employees, wages and salary accruals,
retrieved from the Economic Database of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2014b). These
data are all quarterly or of higher frequency and transformed into quarterly data. To value
the cash flows we use a term structure of interest rates based on U.S. Treasury zero-coupon
rates for maturities from 1 to 10 years from the Federal Reserve Board (2014). Pension plan
data are obtained from the Public Plans Database of the Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College (2014). As far as the demography is concerned, we use the National Population
Estimates for 2010 by single year of age and sex provided by the United States Census Bureau
(2014). Further, we use the survival rates derived from the Cohort Life Tables for the Social
Security Area by Year of Birth and Sex provided by the U.S. Social Security Administration
(2014). These life tables are available for birth years with 10 years intervals. Therefore, we
linearly interpolate the survival rates for the birth years in between the ones directly available.
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4 The economic scenario generator
An economic scenario is one possible realization of economic variables over a certain period
of time in the future. It is generally not known which scenario will occur in reality, hence
our simulations make use of a number of possible scenarios to evaluate the performance of an
object of interest under all these realizations. Here, we use a vector auto-regressive (VAR)
model to generate scenarios. We estimate the VAR on historical data for the U.S. Then, using
the estimated VAR, we generate a set of scenarios and use this same set for all alternative
policies that we study.







 = α + ΓXt + εt+1, (7)
where yt+1 is the short-term interest rate, xst+1 is the excess return on stocks, cpit+1 is consumer
price inflation and wt+1 is nominal wage growth, all in natural logarithms.The noise term εt+1
follows a multivariate normal distribution:
εt+1 ∼ N(0,Σ). (8)
Further,
α = (I−Γ)µ, (9)
where I denotes the identity matrix and µ is the unconditional mean of the vector Xt for all t.
Equation (8) implies that:
Et [Xt+1] = (I−Γ)µ+ ΓXt. (10)
The estimates α̂ and Γ̂ for α and Γ, respectively, are obtained by estimating equation (7) using
OLS. We obtain Σ̂ as the variance-covariance estimate of the vector of error terms. Given Γ̂
and α̂, the estimate µ is:
µ̂ = (I−Γ̂)−1α̂. (11)
The estimates α̂, Γ̂, Σ̂ and µ̂ are used for pricing the cash flows – see below.
5 Valuation
A pension plan is a financial contract whose payoff depends on market contingencies. For
example, the contract might specify that benefits are higher and/or contributions are lower
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when market outcomes are good, and vice versa. In that case, the implicit return on the
pension deal depends on the plan specifics as well as the market conditions. If we perceive the
pension contract as a combination of contingent claims, we can value the pension deal using the
derivative pricing techniques of risk-neutral valuation introduced by Black and Scholes (1973).
Specific valuation issues of contingent claims in pension contracts are discussed in Hoevenaars
and Ponds (2008), Lekniute (2011) and Ponds and Lekniute (2011).
To value a contract we use the scenarios for the underlying variables produced by our scenario
generator. One can calculate the market value of a contingent claim by using deflators and
real-world scenarios, or using risk-neutral scenarios. Both alternatives should result in the same
outcome. Here, we will use risk-neutral valuation. We want to value the pension contract to
the different stakeholders of the fund. Therefore, we will calculate the value of the net benefits
of each cohort of pension fund participants and of each cohort of tax payers and of the residual
assets in the fund. We will value the cash flows over a horizon of T years.
The value V P,a0 of the pension contract to participants of the cohort aged a at the starting
moment t = 0 is:

















where Rfj = 1 + r
f
j is the gross return on a short-term risk-free bond and r
f
j the corresponding
(net) rate of return in time period j. EQ0 is the risk-neutral expectation under the Q measure
of the cash flows discounted against the risk-free rate. Further, NBat is the net benefit, which
is the contribution for workers and the benefit payment for pensioners, hence NBat is negative
for workers and positive for retirees. Therefore, for a cohort that is already retired at t = 0,
V P,a0 > 0. NB
a
t occurs in the middle of time period t. Hence, it is discounted only for half of
period t. Similarly, the value of the tax payers’ contributions is calculated as

















where CTt is the tax-payers’ contribution in dollars. Finally, at the end of evaluation horizon
the pension fund generally has some assets left, of which the value is analogously calculated as:











In line with the literature (e.g., see Cochrane, 2005), we assume that the stochastic discount
rate −mt+1 for the real-world scenario’s is given by the following function of the state vector
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generated by our VAR model and the shocks to this state vector:




′Σ(β0 + β1Xt) + (β0 + β1Xt)
′εt+1, (12)
where β0 and β1 are a vector and a matrix of parameters respectively and e indicates the
position of the short rate in the state vector:
e = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)′.
Appendix B shows the details for the pricing of the cash flows and the transformation to the
risk-neutral scenarios needed to calculate the value of the pension contract.
6 Baseline settings for our U.S. state plan
The annual averages in the scenario set generated as explained in Section 4 and used for further
calculations, are 11.7% for the stock returns, 6.3% for 10-year Treasury bonds, 5.7% for nominal
wage growth and 3.7% for consumer price inflation.
We set the simulation horizon to 75 years. At the start t = 0 of the simulation horizon we set
the population of our pension fund equal to the aggregate number of participants in 2010 of all
the state plans covered by the data from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College
(2014). As a result, our pension fund initially has approximately 24 million participants. While
these data do not include all the U.S. public pension plans, it does include a very substantial
share of the U.S. public sector workers at the sub-national level. Hence, the magnitude of
the net burden on the tax payers that we will expose below provides a good indication of the
seriousness of the public sector pension underfunding problem for the U.S., although it is likely
only a lower bound to the problem. The initial demography of the fund is assumed to be
identical to that of the U.S. population in 2010. Hence, the relative sizes of the cohorts are
equal to that for the U.S. in 2010.
The fund’s demography evolves as follows over the simulation horizon. Individuals enter the
labor market at the age of 25. Hence, for the first 25 years of the simulation horizon we
determine the sizes of the 25-year old cohort by taking the sizes of the cohorts younger than 25
in the U.S. population in 2010 and projecting the size of each such cohort when it reaches the
age of 25 by using the survival probabilities. The number of new entrants for the remaining
50 years of a simulation run is calculated by extending over time the trend in the size of the
25-year old cohort, i.e. by calculating the average growth rate of the 25-year old cohort over
the first 25 years and taking this as the annual growth rate for the next 50 years. At the start
of the simulation there are about 260 thousand 25-year old males and about 250 thousand
25-year old females entering the fund. During the first 25 years the number of new 25-year
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olds decreases on average by 0.34% per year. Extrapolating this trend over the next 50 years
yields roughly 200 thousand and 190 thousand new male and female entrants, respectively, in
the final simulation year.
Our baseline simulation is based on the most common characteristics of the U.S. state pension
plans. Its liabilities are computed by using the entry age normal actuarial method for liability
recognition and are based on the following actuarial assumptions. Individuals retire at the age
of 65. Hence, a full career means that they work for 40 years. We distinguish between men
and women in terms of the survival rates, but we assume no gender differences in wage levels.
The career (age-wage) profile is obtained from Bucciol (2012). We assume that the shape of
this profile does not change over time, hence the wage earned at a given age increases each year
with the common wage growth rate in the economy. The t = 0 average wage rate is set such
that the fund’s initial liabilities L0 are equal to 3,400 billion dollars, which is the aggregate
amount of liabilities in 2010 over all pension funds in the Public Plans Database of the Center
for Retirement Research at Boston College (2014).3 The benefit factor, or accrual rate, is 2%
for each additional year of service, while the earnings base for the retirement benefit is the
average of the final three years of pay during the career. During retirement there is always full
indexation for consumer price inflation, also when inflation is negative.
Projected benefits are heightened up with an assumed salary increase of 5.4% for each working
year and with an assumed rate of annual price inflation of 3.5% for years in retirement. Note
that the salary increase used in the projections does not necessarily have to be equal to the
realization or even the average of the wage growth in the economy. It is based on the average for
the funds in our sample. Future retirement benefits are discounted at a fixed rate of 8% a year,
which is the current median for the U.S. state pension funds. Hence, the implicit assumption
is that the fund’s assets earn an average annual return of 8%. We assume the initial accrued
pension rights, Ba0 , to have been fully indexed up to time t = 0.
Contributions to the fund are calculated as follows. The annually required contribution is set
to the normal cost plus the required amortization payment. The latter is fixed at zero in the
case of a fund surplus (one-sided policy). The normal cost is calculated as a percentage of
the projected career salary based on the EAN actuarial method. The amortization payment
is determined by spreading the unfunded actuarial accrued liability UAAL in equal annual
payments over the next 30 years, with a moving 30-years window. Hence, we use the so-called
open amortization period. The employees pay a fixed 6% contribution of their salary, while
the employer pays the remainder of the required contribution. The actual contribution is set
to 100% of the normal cost, plus 50% of the required amortization payment. Our sample data
show that, assuming that the normal cost is paid in full, the actual amortization payment is on
average 10% of the required amortization payment. However, these data are for the year 2010,
3Effectively, this implies that we have to scale down the wage relative to the actual average U.S. wage in
2010. Implicitly, this rescaling corrects for the potential presence of vesting periods, which are not explicitly
included in our model of the pension fund, and the difference between average public and economy-wide wages.
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the year following the year with the worst economic performance since the Great Depression
and a year with unusually large declines in the value of stocks. This suggests that the share of
the required amortization payment paid in that year may have been unusually low. Because
of the lack of potentially more representative data we thus assume that 50% of the required
amortization payment is paid in a year. However, below we will also examine variations on the
baseline in which less or more of the required amortization payment is paid in a year.
The funding position of the pension fund is calculated as the ratio of the actuarial assets
computed by averaging the excess returns of the last 5 years and the amount of liabilities. We
set the initial funding ratio FR0 equal to 75%, which is close to the average 2010 funding ratio
of 73% of the pension funds in our database. Based on FR0 and the initial liabilities, which
are thus both matched to our data, we obtain the initial actuarial assets of the fund:
Aact0 = FR0 · L0.
Although more asset classes exist, we simplify the asset mix somewhat and assume that the
fund invests 50% of its assets in fixed income and the other 50% in risky assets. This implies
that an average annual return on the fund’s portfolio is 9%.
7 The reforms
We consider a number of variations on the baseline plan, which we refer to as Plan 0.0, to
explore what various policy changes imply for the contract values of the various stakeholders.
This can give us leads about the effectiveness of different measures in increasing the financial
sustainability of the pension fund and, hence, in reducing reliance on the support from the tax
payers.
We consider three groups of measures, which we summarize in Table 1. The first set of measures,
Plans 1.1-1.4, addresses the contribution rate. Plans 1.1 and 1.2 vary the fraction of the required
amortization payment actually paid, Plan 1.3 shortens the period over which the amortization
payment is spread, while Plan 1.4 doubles the contribution payment by the participants from
6% to 12%, but leaves the total contribution rate unchanged. In other words, in Plan 1.4 the
financial health of the pension fund itself is unaffected, while the burden on the tax payers is
alleviated.
The second set of alternatives addresses the degree of indexation. As under the baseline plan,
under each alternative plan, when CPI inflation is negative, then indexation is always full (thus
negative). Plan 2.1 halves indexation when CPI inflation is positive. Under Plan 2.2, if CPI
inflation is positive, then indexation to CPI inflation is conditional on the level of the funding
ratio FR. Specifically, if cpi ≥ 0, indexation is 0, if FR < 0.5, and (2 ∗ FR − 1) ∗ cpi, if
FR ≥ 0.5. In other words, if CPI inflation is positive, indexation is zero for funding ratios
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1.1 0% amortization paid
1.2 100% amortization paid
1.3 Amortization spread over 10 years
1.4 Participants’ contribution rate doubled to 12%
Indexation





below one half, while it increases linearly with the funding ratio for funding ratios of at least
one half. Hence, a funding ratio above unity implies more than full indexation. This way of
providing conditional indexation is closely related to the way most Dutch pension funds index
their pension rights, (see Ponds and van Riel (2009) and Beetsma and Bucciol (2011b)). We
continue to set contributions on the basis of a normal cost that is still calculated under the
assumption of full indexation. We do this in order to see the isolated effect of the reduction in
indexation. Otherwise, the comparison with the baseline would be contaminated by a fall of
the normal cost in response to reduced indexation, which through lower contributions would in
turn dampen the beneficial effect of less indexation on the fund’s financial health.
The third group of measures concerns the composition of the fund’s asset portfolio, which we
vary from zero to 100% stocks.
8 Results
8.1 The ”classic” ALM results
This subsection discusses the ”classic” (i.e., not applying market-based valuation) ALM sim-
ulation results under the baseline and the alternative policies. Here, and in the sequel, we
simulate a set of 5000 economic scenarios each over a horizon of 75 years. This horizon allows
us to take into account a number of cohorts that have not entered the fund at the start of the
evaluation horizon. Moreover, it is a commonly-used horizon for pension policy evaluation in
the U.S.
Table 2a reports for the various plans the 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles after 25 years for
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the funding ratio FR, the pension result PR, the total contribution rate (c), the normal cost
payment (cNC), the amortization payment (cAmort) and the sponsor support payment (cSS).
The pension result is defined as the ratio of cumulative granted indexation to cumulative price
inflation, i.e. PRt =
∏t
τ=0 (1 + πτ )/
∏t
τ=0 (1 + cpiτ ). Hence, the lower it is, the larger the
deterioration in the purchasing power of the benefits. All contribution measures are expressed
in percentages of wage sum. Table 2b reports all the corresponding numbers after 75 years.
Consider first the results for the baseline. After 75 years the median value of the funding ratio
is slightly above its initial value of 75%. However, we observe a wide spread in the development
of the funding ratio. Its fifth percentile after 75 years is 0, implying that the fund is effectively
run on a pay-as-you-go basis, with benefits on a period-by-period basis paid from participants’
and tax payers contributions. The substantial probability of deterioration of the funding ratio
is not surprising in view of the fact that only 50% of the required amortization costs is paid
when the fund’s financial health is poor. The pension result is by construction equal to unity
because full indexation is always granted, including a negative adjustment in case of deflation.
Table 3 reports the probability that all assets are fully depleted within the 75-year simulation
horizon. This probability is 9% for the baseline, while, conditional on a full depletion taking
place, the median year in which this happens is 65 years from the start of the simulation.
We now discuss the variations on the baseline setting. Under all the alternatives the component
of the contribution rate based on the normal cost increases from approximately 16% after 25
years to somewhat less than 18% after 75 years, under the full indexation assumption. When no
amortization payments are made (Plan 1.1), the total contribution rate is equal to the normal
cost. However, this leads to a dramatic expected deterioration of the funding ratio. Even the
median funding ratio after 75 years is 0 and the chances that the funds assets are fully depleted
within the simulation horizon rises to 59%. By contrast, a shift to 100% amortization under
Plan 1.2 tends to produce a gradual improvement of the funding ratio; the median funding
ratio after 75 years is 1.27. The spread in the distribution of the funding ratio is still quite
high, but extremely low funding ratios are not very likely at the end of the horizon. Indeed,
the probability of a full depletion of the funds assets within the simulation horizon is virtually
zero. The flip side of the improvement in the financial position of the fund is, of course, that
the total contribution rate c rises. The median contribution rate after 25 years is slightly
more than 21%, hence more than 1 percentage point above the median under the baseline
and 5 percentage points above the median under Plan 1.1. In the long run, however, the
improved financial position of the fund allows contribution rates to fall again. After 75 years,
no amortization payment is needed anymore under Plan 1.2 on average, whereas the base plan
with only half of required amortization paid still requires 3% amortization on average. Reducing
the amortization period to 10 years has a similar and, in fact, even stronger positive effect on
the fund’s financial position. Compared to Plan 1.2 the distribution of funding ratios after 75
years shifts even further upwards. Of course, the contribution rates in the meantime tend to
be even higher, with a ninety-fifth percentile of 34% after 25 years, as compared to 30% under
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Table 2: Classic ALM results
(a) after 25 years
0.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2
FR 5% 32% 15% 44% 52% 32% 40% 45% 24% 21%
FR 50% 69% 56% 79% 87% 69% 81% 81% 109% 32%
FR 95% 155% 144% 162% 170% 155% 174% 148% 493% 49%
PR 5% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 54% 41% 100% 100%
PR 50% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 67% 69% 100% 100%
PR 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 121% 100% 100%
c 5% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 23%
c 50% 20% 16% 21% 21% 20% 18% 18% 16% 25%
c 95% 25% 16% 30% 34% 25% 23% 22% 26% 26%
cAmort 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6%
cAmort 50% 4% 0% 5% 5% 4% 2% 2% 0% 8%
cAmort 95% 8% 0% 14% 18% 8% 7% 6% 9% 10%
cNC 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
cSS 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
cSS 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
cSS 95% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
(b) after 75 years
0.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2
FR 5% 0% 0% 40% 58% 0% 33% 48% 0% 0%
FR 50% 79% 0% 127% 156% 79% 171% 109% 356% 0%
FR 95% 636% 522% 732% 799% 636% 917% 226% 7856% 1%
PR 5% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 17% 11% 100% 100%
PR 50% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 25% 65% 100% 100%
PR 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 37% 1580% 100% 100%
c 5% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 31%
c 50% 21% 18% 18% 18% 21% 18% 18% 18% 32%
c 95% 32% 18% 35% 36% 32% 26% 24% 32% 33%
cAmort 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13%
cAmort 50% 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 14%
cAmort 95% 14% 0% 17% 18% 14% 9% 7% 14% 15%
cNC 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
cSS 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
cSS 50% 0% 18% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7%
cSS 95% 7% 26% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 8% 11%
Note: classic ALM results for the 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles of the funding ratio (FR), the
pension result (PR), the contribution rate (c), which is split into amortization (cAmort) and
normal cost (cNC), and sponsor support (SS) for the base Plan 0.0 and alternative
contribution (Plans 1.1-1.4), indexation (Plans 2.1-2.2) and investment (Plans 3.1-3.2)
policies.
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Table 3: Likelihood of full depletion of assets
0.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2
Probability 9.0% 59.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.0% 0.1% 0.0% 11.8% 97.2%
Year, 5% 47.5 29 - - 47.5 54.75 - 34 51
Year, 50% 65 47 - - 65 66.5 - 57 61
Year, 95% 75 70 - - 75 74 - 74 72
Note: the first line reports the probability that the fund’s assets are fully depleted within the
75-year simulation horizon. The following lines show the percentiles for the distribution of the
years of depletion, conditional on scenarios in which depletion takes place within the
simulation horizon. As an example, under the baseline Plan 0.0, given that depletion takes
place, in less than 5% of the cases this happens within the first 28 years of the simulation
period. If there is no single year that stands exactly in the position of the quantile, then
averages of the surrounding years are taken. Hence, the moment a quantile is reached can be
a fraction of a full year.
Plan 1.2 and 25% under the base plan. However, at the end of the full horizon, the median
contribution rate for the amortization has fallen to zero and, hence, the total contribution rate
is 3 percentage points below the level under the baseline Plan 0.0. The reported numbers
under Plan 1.4 are identical to those under the baseline. Funding ratios, total contributions
and amortization contributions are identical, though of the total contributions now twice as
much as before is paid by the participants.
The second set of alternative measures introduces changes in the indexation rate. Plan 2.1
always yields lower indexation, implying an expected improvement in the financial position of
the funding over the long horizon. Although a long-term halving of the indexation rate has
a substantial effect on the purchasing power of the pension benefits, the improvement in the
funding ratio is not as spectacular as one might a priori expect, because the total contribution
in the meantime falls below that under the baseline. While the normal cost rate remains the
same, the amortization contribution rate becomes lower than under the baseline. After 25
years, the median total contribution rate is 2 percentage points lower than under the baseline.
At the end of the full horizon, the median amortization contribution rate has fallen to zero
and the difference in the median total contribution with the baseline has risen to 3 percentage
points.
A shift from the baseline to conditional indexation (Plan 2.2) also tends to improve the financial
position of the fund. Compared to Plan 2.1, where indexation is halved, the spread in the
distribution of the funding ratios becomes smaller, with the fifth percentile under Plan 2.2 at
the end of the 75-year horizon located at 48% instead of 33% under Plan 2.1. The compression
in the distribution of funding ratios is not surprising, because the policy is specifically aimed at
stabilizing the funding ratio with smaller indexation given when the fund’s financial situation is
unhealthy and higher, possibly more than full, indexation given when the fund runs a surplus.
As a result, the distribution of the total contribution rates is also more compressed. At the end
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of the full horizon, the median amortization contribution rate is zero.
Our third set of measures looks at changes in the pension fund’s asset portfolio. Not surprisingly,
a policy of investing 100% of the portfolio in stocks, Plan 3.1, raises the median funding ratio
compared to the baseline, but it also raises the spread in funding ratios. After 75 years there
is a non-negligible probability that the assets are down to zero. A complete shift out of stocks,
Plan 3.2, leads over time to a downward shift of the entire distribution of the funding ratios,
such that even the ninety-fifth percentile of the distribution after 75 years is almost zero under
this plan. This is not surprising, as the normal cost is based on liabilities calculated with a
discount rate higher than the expected portfolio return under Plan 3.2, implying a systematic
shortage of resources in the fund.
Overall, it can be concluded that under many of the settings studied here the pension plan
is likely to be unsustainable. The factors contributing to this conclusion are the fund’s initial
underfunding and the long amortization period in combination with the amortization contri-
bution rate being lower than the required rate. A policy of reducing the indexation rate helps
in keeping the plan financially sustainable, although such a policy may not be as effective as is
a priori expected. Also a policy of conditional indexation helps in keeping the fund financially
healthy. The advantage of such a policy is that it compresses the distribution of funding ratios,
because the indexation rate is explicitly linked to the funding ratio.
8.2 The value-based ALM results
The classic ALM results discussed above have provided us with a number of interesting results
regarding the effectiveness of alternative policies to strengthen the financial sustainability of our
pension fund. Value-based ALM is useful to assess changes in the market value of the pension
contract to its various stakeholders when shifting from the baseline plan to another plan. To
this end it is instructive to show the balance sheet in Table 4. The left-hand side reports the
value of the initial assets of the pension fund (A0) and the present value of the contributions by
all cohorts of tax payers (V T0 ) over the 75 years evaluation period. On the right-hand side we
find the present value of the net benefits aggregated over all cohorts of participants (V P0 ), which
consists of net benefits received over the evaluation horizon, plus the present value of the stock
of pension rights remaining at the end of the evaluation horizon. To evaluate these remaining
pension rights we use the EAN method, which means that we take the PVB liabilities, i.e. both
future accrual and wage advances are taken into account, and subtract the present value of the
future normal cost. What remains is the present value of the fund residue (V R0 ), which is the
difference between the present value of the final assets at the end of the evaluation horizon and
the present value of final pension rights of the participants.4
4Alternatively, the residual value could have been attributed to the tax payers, since it is net of the value of
the pension rights of the participants alive at the end of the evaluation horizon. However, in the sequel we keep
it separate from the tax payers’ value based on their contributions and sponsor support SSt.
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We evaluate at t = 0 the baseline contract (denoted by a tilde) and changes relative to the
baseline. Reforms are zero-sum games in value terms across the funds’ stakeholders:





where V0 is the value of the new plan and ∆V0 ≡ V0− Ṽ0 the change in value from the baseline.
For example, if the contributions of the tax payers to the pension fund increase, this implies
that the value of the fund residue, the value of the net benefits to the participants, or both,
must increase. The initial assets from the balance sheet do not appear in this expression, as
we start with the same value of initial assets under all alternative plans. Hence, the change in
the value of the initial assets is always 0. We are also interested in the relative change ∆RV0





We report the results in a number of ways. In particular, we report values for the entire group
of participants, the entire group of tax payers, individual cohorts of participants, individual
cohorts of tax payers and for the residue of the fund. The value of the participant cohort aged
a in period 0 is denoted by Ṽ P,a0 or V
P,a
0 and follows directly from the cash flows associated
with the pension contract. The aggregate cash flows in a year from all the tax payers together
are also immediately available. However, calculating the values Ṽ T,a0 or V
T,a
0 for the individual
cohorts of tax payers aged a in period 0 requires an assumption about the allocation of the
aggregate cash flows across these cohorts. We assume that the demographic structure of the
tax payer population is identical to that of the participant population and that the cash flows
assigned to the individual tax payer cohorts are proportional to the shares of the individual
cohorts in aggregate income. Hence, for each cohort of tax payers, the contribution is based
on the size of the cohort and the income level of an individual cohort member. For tax payers
of working age, the relative contribution of each cohort is fixed through the age-wage profile,
which is constant over time. The relative contribution of each cohort of retired tax payers is
based on the average (across all moments under all scenarios) income under the baseline plan.
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8.2.1 Baseline
Figure 1 shows for the baseline, Plan 0.0, the value of the contract Ṽ P,a0 and Ṽ
T,a
0 in billions of
dollars for the various cohorts of fund participants and tax payers, respectively. The youngest
generation is the one to be born in 50 years (age −50 at t = 0), whereas the oldest is 99
years old at the start of the simulation period. The figure gives an impression of the order
of magnitude of the amounts at stake for the various cohorts of stakeholders in the aggregate
state-level public sector in the U.S. In present value terms, under the baseline plan over the 75-
year simulation horizon, the aggregate net benefit over all participant cohorts is approximately
28 trillion dollars, while the aggregate contribution over all tax payer cohorts is approximately
17 trillion dollars.5 These are sizable numbers and, as indicated earlier, they likely form a lower
bound on the actual amount of redistribution from tax payers to fund participants. Importantly,
also, the figure shows the relative distribution of the net benefits across the various participant
cohorts and of the financing burden across the various cohorts of tax payers. It is useful to
notice that the positive and negative areas in the figure do not sum to zero, because the value
of the residue of the fund after 75 years generally differs from the value of the fund’s initial
assets. We see that the value of the contract is positive for all participant cohorts. This is not
surprising for cohorts that have already been working for a while, i.e. the cohorts older than
25 at t = 0, because their contributions are ”sunk”, while the benefits are still ahead of them.
As of the age of fifty, the contract value starts falling steeply with age. For those that are
already retired, i.e. of age 65 and over at t = 0, the amount of future benefits to be received
is shrinking with age. In addition, older cohorts have been accumulating lower rights, ceteris
paribus, because the real wage levels were lower during their work career than for younger
cohorts.
For the cohorts of age 25 and younger at t = 0, the positive contract value is more remarkable,
because in a completely actuarially-neutral system, those who have not yet been contributing
would experience zero value from their pension contract: the value of their future benefits
must be offset by the value of their future contributions. However, this value is only zero
for the cohort born at t = 50, because over the evaluation horizon this cohort will pay zero
contributions and thus build up zero rights. For future generations that are born before t = 50,
the value of the benefits they will receive over the evaluation horizon plus the value of the
accrued rights at the end of the evaluation period exceeds the value of the contributions to be
made during the evaluation period. This net benefit can only be financed out of two sources:
a reduction in the residual value Ṽ R0 of the fund or contributions from the tax payers. From
the figure we observe that the value of the plan Ṽ T,a0 is negative for all cohorts of tax payers.
5In our discussion of these numbers we ignore the fact that part of the tax payer population are also
participants in the fund. Thus, we focus on the gross redistribution between the groups and not on the net
redistribution, which would require more information to construct reliable numbers.
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Participants’ net benefit and tax payers’ option values per age cohort under Plan 0.0, in
billion dollars
8.2.2 Outcomes of the reforms
We report changes in dollar values and in relative values for groups of cohorts of participants
and tax payers. The results are reported in Table 5a (changes in dollar values) and 5b (relative
changes in values) for two groups of participants and two groups of tax payers. Negative relative
values denote a deterioration for the particular stakeholders under consideration. The groups
of the young (superscript Y ) comprise all the cohorts that are younger than 25 or yet unborn
at t = 0, while the groups of the old (superscript O) comprise all the cohorts of age 25 or older
at t = 0. The table also report changes in the value of the residue at the end of the evaluation









0 must be zero. However, due to numerical inaccuracies
small deviations from zero may be possible.
Under Plans 1.1-1.3 neither the contributions made by the plan participants nor the indexation
rules are changed, so ∆V P,Y0 = ∆V
P,O
0 = 0. A reduction in the amortization payment (Plan 1.1)
benefits current tax payers, because they see their amortization contribution rate fall. The value
of the funds residue falls, in line with the expected deterioration of the funding ratio over time.
The policy change also has an effect on the future cohorts of tax payers, as they have to cover
the deficit with sponsor support payments if assets get depleted completely. An increase in
the amortization payment, Plan 1.2, implies higher contribution payments by the tax payers,
so both young and old tax payers experience a loss of value. A similar conclusion holds for a
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Table 5: Effects of plan changes on stakeholders
(a) Level effects










1.1 0% amortization paid 0 0 -465 709 -217
1.2 100% amortization paid 0 0 -1562 -1148 2676
1.3 amortization 10 years 0 0 -2914 -1992 4828
1.4 part. contr. rate doubled -3335 -1105 2963 1477 0
Indexation
2.1 indexation is 0.5*CPI -2453 -3065 2578 383 2570
2.2 conditional indexation -3386 -4605 3573 574 3871
Portfolio composition
3.1 100% stocks 0 0 -277 -105 359
3.2 0% stocks 0 0 132 51 -164
(b) Relative effects










1.1 0% amortization paid 0% 0% -4% 16% -3%
1.2 100% amortization paid 0% 0% -12% -26% 32%
1.3 amortization 10 years 0% 0% -23% -44% 57%
1.4 part. contr. rate doubled -23% -8% 23% 33% 0%
Indexation
2.1 indexation is 0.5*CPI -17% -22% 20% 9% 31%
2.2 conditional indexation -24% -34% 28% 13% 46%
Portfolio composition
3.1 100% stocks 0% 0% -2% -2% 4%
3.2 0% stocks 0% 0% 1% 1% -2%
Note: the effects of switching from baseline Plan 0.0 to Plans 1.1-3.2 on future plan
participants (∆V P,Y0 , ∆RV
P,Y




0 ), future tax
payers (∆V T,Y0 , ∆RV
T,Y




0 ) and the residue of the
pension fund (∆V R0 , ∆RV
R
0 ). Panel (a) reports changes in billions of dollars. Panel (b)
reports relative changes as a percentage of baseline value. Negative numbers imply a
deterioration of the value for that stakeholder.
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shortening of the period over which the amortization takes place, Plan 1.3. The residue value
improves, but at the cost of higher contributions by the current and future tax payers, who
see the value of their stake in the pension arrangement fall by a total of roughly 2.9 and 2.0
trillion dollars, respectively. A doubling of the contribution rate by the participants, Plan 1.4,
reduces the total contribution paid by the tax payers and, thus, shifts value from both groups
of participants to the tax payers. The total value shift from the participants to the tax payers
is more than 4.4 trillion dollars. In percentage terms the older participants lose 8% of the
contract value, while the younger participants lose 23%. The financial position of the fund is
unchanged throughout and, hence, the change in the residue value is zero.
Changes in indexation policy shift value between the participants and the tax payers. Halving
indexation, Plan 2.1, lowers the plan value to the participants and raises the plan value to the
tax payers, who have to pay smaller amortization and sponsor support contributions. The total
value loss to the participants is about 5.5 trillion dollars, or 17% of the contract value of the
younger participants and 22% of the contract value of the older participants, of which about 3
trillion is shifted to the tax payers and the remainder to an increased residue value of the fund,
because the funding ratio is expected to improve in the long-run (relative to the baseline), while
the accrued pension rights of the participants at the end of the evaluation horizon are lower.
Conditional indexation, Plan 2.2, produces qualitatively similar, but quantitatively even larger,
value shifts across the stakeholders. This is because under Plan 2.2 no indexation is given a
times when it is most valuable, and more is given when it is less valuable. Young participants
lose about a quarter of their contract value, while older participants lose even a third of their
contract value.
Our third set of changes concerns changes in the composition of the asset portfolio of the
pension fund. In all of the previous plans the asset mix was kept constant at 50% fixed
income and 50% risky assets. When the portfolio allocation is the same across the plans, the
total amount of risk remains unchanged, but it is shifted among stakeholders due to policy
changes, like changes in the contribution or indexation rules. However, changing the asset mix
changes the risk of the pension fund. Under a symmetrical contract this should not lead to
value transfers, as under such a contract higher volatility is rewarded with higher expected
returns. However, the pension plan policy in question is not symmetrical from the tax payers’
perspective. When bad returns materialize, tax payers have to cover the deficit by increased
amortization and sponsor support payments. However, good returns do not necessarily lead to
lower contribution payments as the contribution can never fall below the normal cost level. To
sum up, the contribution payments are limited on the downside, but unlimited on the upside.
When riskier investments are made (Plan 3.1) the upwards potential of the returns goes to the
residue of the pension fund, but the downwards risk is allocated to the tax payers in the form
of higher amortization and sponsor support payments. Therefore we see negative value changes
for the tax payers and an increase in residue value. In the case of a derisking of the portfolio
(Plan 3.2), the opposite effects can be seen. A much lower downside risk of portfolio returns
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results in a lower probability of high amortization and sponsor support payments, hence the
tax payers are better off. However, the lower expected portfolio returns implied by the less
risky asset mix affect the residue value negatively. Since neither the indexation policy nor the
participant contribution rules have changed, the fund participants are unaffected by changes in
the composition of the fund’s asset portfolio.




































Change in stakeholder values (in billion dollars) when policy is changed from the base
Plan 0.0 to plans with no amortization payment (Plan 1.1), full amortization payment
(Plan 1.2), 10 years amortization smoothing (Plan 1.3) and double contribution rate by
employees (Plan 1.4).
Figures 2 - 4 depict the value consequences of contract changes for all individual cohorts of
participants and tax payers. In line with the figures reported in the above tables, we see
indeed that moving from the baseline plan to Plan 1.1 with zero amortization the older tax
payers are better off, as part of the contribution burden is shifted to the future, while younger
cohorts of tax payers have to make up for the losses of the fund. Moving to 100% amortization,
Plan 1.2, reduces the value for all tax payers, but ensures that the residual value of the fund
is raised. Speeding up amortization, Plan 1.3, also affects all tax payer cohorts negatively
over the simulation horizon, while doubling the contribution by the participants affects all
participants’ values negatively and all tax payers’ values positively. Not surprisingly, a shift
from full indexation to compensation of only half of the CPI, i.e. a shift from Plan 0.0 to
Plan 2.1, lowers the net benefit value for all current participants and the first 35 cohorts of future
participants. All cohorts that enter the fund later see no change in value, because they will
not receive any pension benefit over the simulation horizon. Hence, over the simulation horizon
they are unaffected by the change in indexation. However, since the change in indexation does
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Change in stakeholder values (in billion dollars) when policy is changed from the base
Plan 0.0 to plans with half CPI indexation (Plan 2.1) and conditional indexation (Plan 2.2).


































Change in stakeholder values (in billion dollars) when policy is changed from the base
Plan 0.0 to plans with 100% risky assets (Plan 3.1) and 100% fixed income assets (Plan 3.2).
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affect benefit payments, it affects the final value of the assets and thus the residual value of the
fund. The final liabilities are affected only through the part of the liabilities that belongs to
the final pensioners, as this part incorporates all actual indexation received since retirement.
The part of the liabilities belonging to the cohorts that have not yet retired at the end of the
evaluation horizon does not change due to the assumption of full indexation that, independent
of actual indexation, is retained throughout the different plans. Given that inflation is mostly
positive, getting only half of the inflation indexed leads to lower pension benefit payments and
consequently a lower value of the contract. Similarly, since indexation tends on average to be
lower under conditional indexation, also Plan 2.2 affects the value for the participants in a
negative way. The flip side is that all tax payer cohorts benefit from the two plan changes.
Shifts in the portfolio composition of the pension fund are completely neutral in value terms
for all the participants, because their benefits and contribution payments are unaffected, while
we see small changes in the value for the tax payers. All tax payer cohorts suffer from a move
to a 100% equity portfolio, while most tax payer cohorts benefit from a complete move out of
equity. However, in the latter case, the cohorts born in periods around t = 50 and later lose
from this shift, because the expected depletion of the fund’s assets requires these cohorts to
make additional amortization and sponsor support contributions.
9 Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the financial sustainability and redistributive aspects of a typical U.S.
state DB pension fund under unchanged policies. The results confirm what is generally feared,
namely that current pension policies are unlikely to be financially sustainable. Therefore, we
explored a number of alternative policies, involving changes in the composition of the investment
portfolio of the pension fund, the structure of pension contributions and policies aimed at
reducing benefits, in particular policies that reduce indexation. Some of these measures can
indeed be quite effective at improving the fund’s financial position. Indexation conditional
on the funding ratio is promising, because it can improve the fund’s financial position, while
keeping the potential spread in the funding ratio limited. The reason is that indexation rises
with the size of the funding ratio and may even become more than full for large funding ratios.
We also applied a market-based valuation approach to the cash flows generated by the fund
and we found that under the baseline plan all cohorts of participants experience substantial
net benefits at the expense of all cohorts of tax payers. Policies that raise the contributions
by the participants or that reduce the indexation of benefits are quite effective at shifting part
of the participants’ net benefits back to the tax payers. We estimate the effect of halving the
indexation to CPI inflation at a contract value reduction of around 20% for the participants,
while conditional indexation lowers the participants’ contract value by around 25-30%. In dollar
terms the alleviation of the burden on the tax payers is on the order of 3− 4 trillion dollars for
the changes in indexation policy we consider, while a doubling of the participants’ contribution
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rate produces an alleviation of the tax payers’ burden by around 4.5 trillion dollars.
The sustainability and redistribution issues exposed by this paper may well be a lower bound
to the true extent of the future problems facing the U.S. civil servants’ pension arrangements.
First, our dataset did not include all civil servants’ pension funds. A priori, there is little reason
to assume that the funds that have not been included are financially healthier than the funds
that were part of our dataset. Second, since we did not want to take a specific stand on the
future equity premium, we have worked under the assumption that the future stock returns
are in line with those in the past. However, if future equity premia turn out to be lower than
those in the past, state pension funds’ financial problems may become much more severe than
suggested in the present paper.
A rather general conclusion from our analysis is that the substantial net benefit of the promises
to fund participants at the cost of tax payers could be an argument for fund boards and
participants to initiate steps towards improving their funding by raising contributions or by
cutting back on benefit levels. The looming financial burden on tax payers and the prospective
deterioration of public services may chase away individuals of working age from specific states.
An outcome with falling spending on public goods and rising taxes merely paid to finance
civil servants’ retirement schemes may become politically unsustainable and result in states
defaulting. This could well result in larger value losses to scheme participants than those
associated with orderly reforms backed by a majority of the population.
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Not for publication – for referees’ use
A Calculation of the actuarial assets
Define the Investment Income Amount Of Immediate Recognition (IIAOIR) as a target in-
vestment income based on the expected return R̄t:
IIAOIRt = At(R̄t − 1) + (Ct −Bt)(R̄1/2t − 1). (13)
The so-called Investment Income Market Total (IIMT ) denotes the actual realization of in-
vestment income, i.e. the difference between the market value of assets at the end of the year
and the market value of assets at the beginning of the year, less the net cash inflow associated
with contributions and benefits. From equation (3) we get:
IIMTt = At+1 − At − (Ct −Bt) = At(Rt − 1) + (Ct −Bt)(R1/2t − 1). (14)
Finally, the Investment Income Amount For Phased In Recognition (IIAFPIR) is realized
investment income in excess of expected investment income:
IIAFPIRt = IIMTt − IIAOIRt.
Hence, IIAFPIRt is positive when the actual investment return exceeds its expected value,
and vice versa. The usual smoothing procedure to calculate actuarial assets involves taking
the average of the excess investment incomes over the past. We define the Total Recognized







Then, the actuarial value of the assets at the beginning of year t+1 will be determined by raising
the actuarial value of assets at the beginning of year t with the net money inflows (contribution
payments minus the benefit pay-outs), investment income of immediate recognition and the
smoothed value of the excess investment income over the past v years:
Aactt+1 = A
act
t + (Ct −Bt) + IIAOIRt + TRIGt. (15)
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B Pricing according to risk-neutral scenarios
This appendix provides the details of our valuation of the cash flows associated with the pension
contract.
B.1 General pricing framework
Consider some derivative (e.g., the pension contract) with a payoff of Zτ at time τ , which is a













In a complete market it is possible to sell the derivative at time t+ 1 for its price Pt+1. Hence
the following must hold:
Pt = Et [Pt+1 expmt+1] , (16)
where Pt+1 is the total price based on the total return index where any payoff is reinvested in
the same index. If we use lower-case letters to denote log-values so that
pt = logPt,
knowing that Xt+1 has a Gaussian distribution, and using the properties of the log-normal
distribution, we can derive from equation (16):
exp pt = Et [exp pt+1 expmt+1] = Et [exp(pt+1 +mt+1)]
= exp (Et [pt+1 +mt+1] + 1/2 Vart [pt+1 +mt+1]) ,
Hence,
pt = Et [pt+1 +mt+1] + 1/2 Vart [pt+1 +mt+1] . (17)
Note that




′Σ(β0 + β1Xt), (18)
Vart [mt+1] = (β0 + β1Xt)
′Σ(β0 + β1Xt). (19)





t the period-t price of a zero coupon bond that matures at time t + n and pays




t = −Dn −H ′nXt. (20)
Its nominal yield Y
(n)





= P nt . (21)
If we denote ln(1 + Y
(n)
t ) as y
(n)


























































Using (18), (19) and (10) we can rewrite (23) as
p
(n)

















+H ′n−1Σ(β0 + β1Xt),
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− (e′ +H ′n−1Γ−H ′n−1Σβ1)Xt.
The last equation is already of the affine structure as in equation (20) with parameters





H ′n−1ΣHn−1 −H ′n−1Σβ0,
Hn = e+ (Γ− Σβ1)′Hn−1.
(24)





t = ln 1 = 0,











t = −e′Xt = −y
(1)
t , (27)
because e indicates the position of the short rate in the state vector. The deflator is calibrated
on the short rate so that this constraint is satisfied.
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B.1.2 Investable assets
The excess return on investable assets other than the nominal bond is defined as follows and
can be rearranged using (27):





− y(1)t = pt+1 − pt + p
(1)
t , (28)
pt+1 = rt+1 − y(1)t + pt − p
(1)
t . (29)
Using (25) in (23) we get
p
(1)
t = Et [mt+1] +
1
2
Vart [mt+1] . (30)





= Et[pt+1]− (Et [pt+1 +mt+1] + 1/2 Vart [pt+1 +mt+1])













Vart [pt+1]− Covt [pt+1,mt+1] .
Using (29) and the fact that pt and p
(1)
t are known at time t, so that
Vart[pt+1] = Vart[rt+1 − y(1)t + pt − p
(1)
















rt+1 − y(1)t ,mt+1
]
. (32)
The excess return on assets other than the nominal bond can also be written as
rt+1 − y(1)t = e′iXt+1 = e′i ((I−Γ)µ+ ΓXt + εt+1) ,
where ei is a unit vector representing the location of investable asset i in the state vector. It
follows from equation (32) and (12) that





iεt+1]− Covt [e′iεt+1,−(β0 + β1xt)′εt+1]
= −(1
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(Γ− Σβ1)i∗ = 0,
(33)
where i represents the i-th element of a vector, ii represents the element in i-th row and i-th
column, while i∗ stands for i-th row of a matrix. Hence, the first equation yield one condition,
whereas the second equation yields as many conditions as there are state variables. It follows
that the conditions in (33) must be satisfied for investable assets. These conditions determine
the parameters β0 and β1 of the discount factor.
B.2 Parameter optimization
The empirical values α̂ and Γ̂ for α and Γ in equation (7) are determined by regressing the
state variables on their lagged values, using multivariate OLS. Then, Σ̂ is the variance of the
residuals, i.e. the difference between the observed and the fitted values. We use these values of
α̂, Γ̂ and Σ̂ in the sequel.
Given Γ̂ and α̂, the estimate µ̂ of the average µ can be obtained from (9):
µ̂ = (I−Γ̂)′α̂. (34)
The empirical values D̂n and Ĥn for Dn and Hn in equation (22) are obtained by regressing
the historical time series of zero-coupon yields on the time series of the state variables using
multivariate OLS.
The optimal β̃0 and β̃1 are obtained through an optimization procedure with several restrictions
imposed. The model parameters D̃n and H̃n are implied by these values of β̃0 and β̃1 through
the recursion in equation (24).
B.2.1 Optimization for β1
We obtain β̃1 by minimizing the criterion function given by the euclidean norm derived from
the following restriction:
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Constraint 1: we impose that the exposures of the nominal yields towards the state variables
for maturities n = [15, 30] quarters as predicted by the model coincide with those obtained
from the historical data (H̃n = Ĥn).
We want to satisfy the constraint by finding an optimal Σβ1 value that minimizes the criterion






e+ (Γ̂− Σβ1)′Hsvn−1 − Ĥsvn
)2
, (35)
where τ = {15, 30} and Hsvn indicates the exposure to the state variable sv of the interest rate
for maturity n.
The optimization is done by varying the rows of matrix Σβ1 that do not correspond to investable
assets. The rows of matrix Σβ1 corresponding to investables are set to be equal to the respective
rows of Γ̂ (from (33)).
The matrix Σβ1 with some rows variable is then used in (24) to calculate the exposures of
nominal yields to state variables (Hn), and these are compared to values of regression parameters
(Ĥn), the differences being minimized.
When the optimal values ˜(Σβ1) of matrix Σβ1 are found, Σ̂ is used to extract β̃1:
β̃1 = Σ̂
−1 ˜(Σβ1). (36)
The optimal values β̃1, and H̃n implied by it via (24), are used in the remaining optimization
procedure and further in the model.
B.2.2 Optimization for β0
We obtain β̃0 by minimizing the criterion function given by the euclidean norm derived from
the following restrictions:
Constraint 1. D̃n must be equal to Ďn implied by the current term structure and H̃n for
maturities {15, 30}. Using H̃n and the current observation of the state variables, we calculate
the current yield curve, as predicted by the model without the intercept. Then the intercept
Ďn is calculated to match the current yield curve by setting it equal to the difference between
the observed current yield curve and the one predicted by the model without a constant. This
is done for maturities n = {15, 30}, following the recursion in (24).
Constraint 2. For each investable asset, α̂ obtained from the regression must satisfy the first









We want to satisfy these constraints by finding an optimal β0 value that minimizes the criterion


























where τ = {15, 30}.
The optimal value β̃0, and D̃n implied by it, are used further in the model.
B.3 Fixed-income returns
The model generates scenarios for the term structure of interest rates. The fixed-income port-
folio returns have to be extracted from this information. A unit coupon bearing bond priced
















where cp is the annual coupon payment and τ is the bond maturity in years. The coupon of a















When the coupon is determined, the cash flows of the bond are known. Hence, by discounting
them with the interest rate term structure at the beginning of the period and the term structure
at the end of the period the return can be calculated by subtracting the former value from the
latter value. The interest rate term structure follows from the affine structure model. The bond
































For the fixed-income portfolio we assume a portfolio consisting of 10-year maturity bonds that
are priced at par. The portfolio is rebalanced at the beginning of every time period so that it
again consists of 10-year maturity bonds.
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C Risk-neutral sampling
The price of a derivative paying a cash flow Z (which is a function of the path X1, X2, ...Xτ of









Using (12) this equation can be rewritten as
P0 =
∫






















































(εt + Σ(β0 + β1Xt−1))
′Σ−1 (εt + Σ(β0 + β1Xt−1))
)]
dε1dε2...dετ .
This integral can be evaluated numerically in a Monte Carlo simulation by drawing a number












(εt + Σ(β0 + β1Xt−1))
′Σ−1 (εt + Σ(β0 + β1Xt−1))
)]
, (38)










· Z(ε1, ε2, ..., ετ ),
and taking a simple average over the drawings. Hence, we have transformed the original problem
in which we draw from the multivariate normal density function of εi and discount cash flows
at the stochastic discount factor into a problem in which we draw from the multivariate normal
density function with mean −Σ(β0 +β1Xt−1) and the same original variance-covariance matrix
Σ, but discount cash flows at the risk-free rate.
The marginal distribution of ε1, ε2, ..., ετ for t ≤ τ can be obtained by integrating over the
remaining variables. Now, consider t = τ − 1. For fixed values of ε1, ε2, ..., ετ−1, variable ετ has
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a normal distribution, so it can be integrated over analytically:











(εt + Σ(β0 + β1Xt−1))




By repeating this procedure for ετ−1, ετ−2, ..., ε1 we find that











(εs + Σ(β0 + β1Xs−1))




The conditional density f(εt|εt−1, ..., ε1) is obtained using the Bayes’ formula:




Using (39) and (40) we get







(εt + Σ(β0 + β1Xt−1))
′Σ−1 (εt + Σ(β0 + β1Xt−1))
]
,
which is normally distributed as:
εt|εt−1, ..., ε1 ∼ N(−Σ(β0 + β1xt−1),Σ).
We can draw ε1, ε2, ..., ετ from the distribution f(ε1, ε2, ..., ετ ) by first drawing ε1 from its
marginal distribution, then drawing ε2 from the conditional distribution f(ε2|ε1), and so on.
Scenarios are produced in pairs using antithetic variables so as to increase the efficiency of the
simulation.
D Generating scenarios
The economic scenarios are generated using the parameters α̂, Γ̂, Σ̂, β̃0,β̃1, D̃n and H̃n.
First, the development of the state variables is modeled for a chosen number of years in the
future, by using (7). The initial value of the state vector is set at the average µ. After the state
vectors have been simulated, the development of the term structure of the interest rate can be
simulated by using (22).
The same procedure is followed for both the real-world and risk-neutral scenarios. The only
difference lies in the dynamics of shock ε. For the real-world simulation the error terms are
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drawn from a normal distribution εt+1 ∼ N(0,Σ) (from (8)). Under the risk-neutral scenarios,
the noise term is normally distributed with εt+1 ∼ N(−Σ(β0 + β1Xt),Σ). Hence, the transfor-
mation from a real-world scenario to the risk-neutral one is done by merely changing the mean
of the distribution.
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